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Abstract: This article examines two cases of state funding cuts to the most prominent 
and active Arab community organisations operating in Canada, the Canadian Arab 
Federation and Palestine House. It contextualises the cuts within broader ‗crisis of 
multiculturalism‘ debates imbued with anti-Arab/anti-Muslim racism and the silencing 
of Palestine advocacy efforts; arguing that the shift to a neoliberal multiculturalism, 
emptied of anti-racist politics, along with the construction of national identities around a 
set of western ‗core values‘ has advanced a marginalising politics that demarcates a 
‗civilisational‘ border which excludes Arabs, Muslims, and by extension Palestine 
solidarity. Curtailing freedom of expression, partly through funding cuts, thus becomes 
a key mechanism for disciplining dissent in racialised communities. 
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As advocacy for Palestinian rights began to make some impact in Canadian 
universities and trade unions, the Canadian state, was well ahead of others, to respond 
with a consistent, repressive ‗silencing campaign‘. The goal of this campaign is: 
quite simply to shut down political activism and scholarly exchange that  
explores Palestinian experiences and/or criticizes the Israeli state. This silencing 
project echoes that of the Israeli state itself, which has systematically clamped 
down on all aspects of Palestinian life while trying to eliminate signs and 
memories of Palestinian existence.
1
 
 
The silencing campaign included a wave of funding cuts by both the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) and the Citizenship and Immigration 
Canada (CIC) to Canada-based Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and 
community groups that were deemed pro-Palestinian.
2
 The Canadian Arab Federation 
(CAF) and Palestine House, the two leading Arab / Palestinian community 
organisations, funded through a Citizenship and Immigration Canada programme to 
deliver services to newcomers of all origins, lost their funding for their English 
language and newcomer settlement programs. The rationale for funding cuts included 
labelling the organisations‘ Palestine related activities and rhetoric as anti-Semitic (with 
a broad enough definition of anti-Semitism to encompass criticism of Israel), and 
reliance on racialised tropes of Arab extremism. At the same time, the violence against 
the Palestinian people and latter‘s resistance to this violence was rendered invisible and 
unimportant.   
A close examination of the silencing campaign specifically against Arab and 
Muslim community organisations has wider implications for oppositional movements, 
especially as we see attempts by a number of governments to criminalise Palestine 
solidarity activism altogether. For example, the British government is attempting to 
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‗prevent town hall boycotts‘ through changes to local council public procurement policy 
and pension schemes.
3
 In the US, legislation attempts to exclude organisations that 
support the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions campaign from public funding or 
contracts.
4
 Therefore, the Canadian experience over the last decade provides a powerful 
foreshadowing of processes that are now emerging in Europe and the United States. 
In addition to locating the funding cuts in Canada in terms of the generalised 
attack on pro-Palestinian activism, the article also relates the cuts to the attack on 
multiculturalism internationally.
5
 And here it is necessary to distinguish between anti-
racist notions of multiculturalism, often brought about by struggles of racialised groups, 
and neoliberal notions of multiculturalism, which amount to ‗culturalism‘, celebration 
of specific cultural tropes (dance, song, food) at the expense of broader structural 
inequalities, including institutionalised racism. For multiculturalism is a contested term 
and has shifted historically and suffered a serious backlash more recently.  
This backlash against official multiculturalism in western states has entailed a 
new framing of national identity around a set of core western values demarcating a 
‗civilisational‘ border, which facilitates the exclusion of Arabs and Muslim, and by 
extension community organisations representing them. Unlike policies of the 1950s and 
‗60s, which demanded cultural assimilation, the new emphasis on creating ‗Britishness‘ 
or ‗Canadianness‘ is framed in terms of ‗core values‘ which minorities must assimilate.  
When it comes to Arab/Muslim community organisations, the assimilation entails 
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remaining silent about issues of foreign policy, community surveillance and racial 
profiling. A set of racialised discursive and administrative disciplining mechanisms, 
including funding cuts, is utilised against organisations refusing such assimilation.   
Although there are very important differences between the European and North 
American debates on multicultural policy, stemming from the different types of 
migration to both areas, the parameters around which such debates are conducted have 
tended to intersect; with the backlash against multiculturalism often stressing its 
promotion of ‗ethnic enclaves‘ and ‗segregated communities‘. Such ‗integration 
debates‘ as Sivanandan has accurately pointed out are about a ‗descent into assimilation, 
under cover of ―community cohesion‖, with British values as the yardstick of 
measurement‘.6 
Underlying the debates, calling for a different type of multiculturalism (in the 
Canadian case an integrative multiculturalism framed around ‗core liberal values‘), or 
repeatedly declaring its failure (in the European case), is usually an essentialised 
Muslim/Arab figure that is unable to integrate into western society and adapt to a new 
value system. Liz Fekete has intricately described the ‗new popular ‗common sense‘ 
racism against Muslims and foreigners‘ invoked in such debates on integration: ‗it is a 
racism that builds on the proliferation of stereotypical generalisations about ‗Muslim 
culture‘ and the Islamic mind-set that have been generated over the last decade.‘7As 
Arat-Koc explained the so-called war on terror ‗jettisoned those of Arab and Muslim 
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background from their place in Western nations and ―Western civilization‖ and made 
precarious the national belonging and political citizenship of many other Canadians of 
colour‘.8Jasmine Zine noted, ‗increasingly positioned as anti-liberal, anti-democratic 
and unnameable to the requirements of modernity, Muslims represent the ―anti-
citizen‖‘.9Studying the categories of ‗Muslim‘ and ‗Arab‘, author Sherene Razack also 
clarified their racial marking outside of whiteness and exclusion as internal-outsiders 
from legal rights and civil liberties.
10
 This has mainly crystalised in the increased 
securitisation of state / community relations, the rushing through of anti-terror 
legislation, mainly aimed at Arabs and Muslims, and the curtailment of civil liberties. 
While such direct disciplining mechanisms have received a level of attention, less 
recognised is the more subtle censorship of activities and groups deemed outside a core 
set of western values.  
Multicultural funding,, which encourages community organisations to become 
more dependent on state funding and less interested in building anti-racist solidarities 
across communities, is often an important disciplining mechanism.  Inevitably, 
community groups‘ focus turns to survival and ‗service provision‘ as they become more 
vulnerable and susceptible to the exercise of state discipline.  
 
Methodologically, in reconstructing the narrative behind the funding cuts this 
paper relies on: official correspondence between the organisations and government 
departments; media reports, including op-ed and editorials; statements from party 
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leaderships and key government figures; and freedom of information requests. In 
examining these materials, it  looks at the ways in which government spokespeople 
justified their  silencing  of counter voices , focusing on the ways organisations are 
described and the references to Canadian ‗values‘ as a means of buttressing  repressive 
measures.  
 
Neoliberal multiculturalism: the Canadian case  
As a ‗new approach to nation-building‘, Canada‘s official multiculturalism has been 
seen as ostensibly tolerant and accepting of cultural difference -- allowing the state to 
both manage and limit what has come to be known as Canadian diversity.
11
 Although 
Canada‘s multicultural policy has long been debated, today the idea of being 
multicultural and tolerant is deeply intertwined with the Canadian national narrative. 
The widely held belief that Canada represents one of the most successful models of 
multiculturalism in the world means that analyses of anti-Arab racism or critical 
accounts of Canadian foreign policy in the Middle East have been few and far between. 
Examining funding  of community groups  in terms of Canada‘s official 
multicultural policy begins to explain the ways in which state  policies have changed 
and how a reliance by community groups on state funds,  in an economic context 
increasingly marked by neoliberalism, depoliticises them  -- turning them into ‗service 
provision‘ organisations rather than advocacy groups. Importantly, it also reveals that 
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the state‘s official rhetoric of commitment to multiculturalism and diversity has not 
been backed with equivalent funding prioritisation. As noted by Abu-Laban and 
Gabriel, by the new millennium, multiculturalism was an area of ‗relatively little state 
spending‘.12 
Multiculturalism as state policy in Canada began in 1971, and was further 
codified with the 1988 passage of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act (CMA), whereby 
Canada became the first country in the world to legally define multiculturalism. 
Canada‘s multicultural policy has been marked by a high degree of fluidity. In the 
1970s, it was framed as ‗ethnic multiculturalism,‘ and focused on the maintenance of 
identities, folklore, and language training. In the 1980s, after coming under criticism for 
the failure to deal with issues of institutional racism, multicultural policy objectives 
shifted to integrate issues of equity in Canadian society. In the 1990s, multicultural 
programmes were once again reframed, and an emphasis on integration and civic 
participation was introduced. By 2009, three new objectives for the Multiculturalism 
Program were approved and came into effect on April 1, 2010: to build an integrated, 
socially cohesive society; to improve the responsiveness of institutions to meet the 
needs of a diverse population; and to actively engage in discussions on multiculturalism 
and diversity at an international level.
13
   
The primary governmental unit for dealing with multicultural policy also 
changed over the years. Originally entrusted to the Multicultural Directorate created for 
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this purpose within the Department of the Secretary of State, the implementation of the 
policy was moved to the new Department of Multiculturalism and Citizenship in 1991. 
The new Department was in turn dismantled in 1993 and the multiculturalism 
programmes transferred to a new Canadian Heritage Department. Finally, in 2008, 
responsibility for administering the Canadian Multiculturalism Act moved from the 
Department of Canadian Heritage to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC).  
Representing a culmination of over a decade of growing dominance of 
neoliberal ideas of governance, a key moment of transition in the practices of funding 
multiculturalism took place in 1995, when the federal Liberals commissioned Brighton 
Research, a private company, to evaluate the multiculturalism programme. One of the 
pivotal recommendations of its report was on funding, noting that ‗past funding 
practices have reinforced the impression that multiculturalism is a programme of special 
interests‘.14 In the subsequent three years, the programme was redesigned in line with 
the report‘s recommendations, so that funding would be provided on a project by 
project basis. Less money was therefore available to fund the general and autonomous 
operations of community groups. Ethnocultural communities were still eligible for 
funding, but they had to address the new objectives and compete with private entities 
when applying for funding. Organisations applying for funds had to craft each project to 
meet funding criteria, thus losing a measure of autonomy and forced to focus on 
‗servicing clients.‘ 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Sage in Race & Class 58 issue: 4, page(s): 7-22, published 
version available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396816686272 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24593/  
9 
 
By 1998, the programme‘s objectives focused less on preserving cultural 
identity and working with community groups dedicated to single communities; instead, 
the goal was to ‗inculcate an attachment to Canada (as opposed to cultural maintenance) 
and to create active citizens‘.15 Ethnocultural organisations did not support this shift at 
the time. In fact, the Canadian Ethnocultural Council criticised the shift, arguing that 
community groups were not consulted, and that the Brighton Report failed to address 
the issue of ongoing funding cuts to multicultural programming to begin with.
16
 
Two shifts occurred simultaneously to the multiculturalism programme. First, it 
suffered decreased funding and was opened up to the market to create competition over 
grants, and was thus made both more vulnerable to and more dependent on 
governmental arbitrariness. Second, the purpose of the programme itself was 
‗increasingly emphasised as a way to deal with global markets and global 
competitiveness‘.17 Thus the objectives of the multiculturalism program, as well as its 
funding, were transformed in line with neoliberal precepts of restructuring 
state/community relations, emphasising efficiency in ‗service delivery , and the purpose 
subordinated to the discourses of neoliberal globalisation.  
Following the electoral victory of the Conservative Party in 2006, a new policy 
review of the programme was conducted in 2007. It recommended adjusting 
multiculturalism programming to focus more on integration and linking the programme 
to broader notions of citizenship and Canadian identity. The minister responsible for the 
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portfolio, Jason Kenney, explained that this ‗allow[ed] for greater coordination between 
the government‘s settlement programs for newcomers and its programs to promote 
further inclusion, participation and shared citizenship for all Canadians‘.18 Kenney, as 
detailed below, would go on to play a central part in authorising the funding cuts to 
CAF and Palestine House. In a speech titled ‗Good Citizenship: The Duty to Integrate‘, 
he explained, 
our immigration program, our citizenship program, our multiculturalism 
program must increasingly focus on integration, on the successful and rapid 
integration of newcomers to Canadian society, and on a deepening 
understanding of the values, symbols and institutions that are rooted in our 
history, not just for newcomers but for all Canadians.
19
  
 
The objectives of the programme were updated even further in 2009, with a 
focus in the direction of inculcating a Canadian identity based on, among other things 
‗promoting intercultural understanding, fostering citizenship, civic memory and pride, 
and respect for core democratic values, and promoting equal opportunity for individuals 
of all origins‘.20 
The three major funding streams involving newcomers and multiculturalism 
were: Settlement, Resettlement, and Inter-Action. Outcomes for the Settlement program 
were stated as Orientation to Newcomers, Language/Skills, Labour Market Access, 
welcoming communities, and finally, Policy and Program Development.
21
 The Inter-
Action stream was conceived as ‗Canada‘s Multiculturalism Grants and Contribution 
Program‘ with the objectives of intercultural/interfaith understanding, civic memory and 
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pride, and respect for core democratic values.
22
 This constituted an ever-clearer 
connection between fostering a unified Canadian identity based on the idea of a set of 
‗core values‘ that belonging to the nation necessitated. Such core values were attributed 
to a specifically western tradition. In the  2009 speech, Kenney noted that there must be 
a focus ‗on the political values that are grounded in our history, the values of liberal 
democracy rooted in British Parliamentary democracy that precisely have given us the 
space to accommodate such diversity.‘  
This shift towards a more integrative multiculturalism, anchored in the discourse 
of core values, coincided with other reorientations of Canadian policy, including a shift 
of foreign policy towards greater alignment with the US and the war on terror. Arun 
Kundnani argues that a similar process took place in Britain as well:  
[the] new conventional wisdom is that a national story of Britishness must be 
promoted in order to bind the nation together around a set of core values, to 
which minorities must assimilate. This integrationism draws on a wider anti-
Muslim political culture associated with the ‗war on terror‘, in which the focus 
is on ‗self-segregation‘, alien values and forced assimilation, rather than on 
institutional racism. 
23
 
 
The idea of common values between Canada and Israel also increased in 
popularity among Canadian politicians, and was fundamental to the new ideological 
construction of the relationship between the two states. Thus, the reorientation of 
citizenship and belonging around ‗values‘ had significance in transforming international 
alliances and the repositioning of Canada in a ‗civilisational‘ camp.  
One of the avenues in which this articulation of citizenship was presented was 
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the Citizenship and Immigration Canada guide for the citizenship test, titled Discover 
Canada: The Rights and Responsibilities of Citizenship. Interestingly, the first letter to 
Palestine House notifying the organisation of a funding review, dated 16  December, 
2011, referenced the guide and noted: ‗as stated in CIC‘s guide to new Canadians ‗some 
Canadians immigrate from places where they have experienced warfare or conflict. 
Such experiences do not justify bringing to Canada violent, extreme or hateful 
prejudice.‘24 The use of the guide is significant: it was utilised for managing what 
experiences the immigrant can and cannot ‗bring‘ into Canada. 
According to a CIC report evaluating the multiculturalism programme, the 
updated guide ‗strengthens the content on common Canadian values such as freedom, 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the equality of men and women‘.25 
Moreover, right after the guide was reissued, ‗an advertisement campaign on citizenship 
was launched which emphasised the meaning of being Canadian and the importance of 
Canada‘s values, symbols, institutions and history‘.26 The use of the guide in the context 
of a letter issued to review organisational funding underlines the use of such seemingly 
benign guides in disciplining communities.  
Defunding the Canadian Arab Federation  
Arab community organisations were historically organised through the Canadian Arab 
Federation (CAF), and the Palestinian community was specifically involved with the 
Palestine House Educational and Cultural Centre (which is a member group of CAF). 
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Both organisations lost their funding for Settlement and English training programmes 
from CIC. The stated reason for the funding cuts to CAF was the perception that the 
organisation‘s leadership was anti-Semitic and supported extremism. As for Palestine 
House, the organisation received a letter explaining that it was losing funding because 
of actions ‗that could arguably be seen as extreme‘.27 The following section traces the 
history and reasoning for those funding cuts, addressing the way both organisations 
were stigmatised and disciplined by the state for their opposition to its uncritical support 
for Israel, and for addressing the increased racial profiling and targeting of Arab-
Canadians.  
CAF was formed in 1967 as a direct response to the 1967 Israeli occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was decided by members of the Arab community that 
there was an urgent need to mobilise, no matter where their place of residence, and 
present a united voice to advocate for Arab-Canadians. CAF was envisaged as a vehicle 
for Arab-Canadians to voice their opinions on the politics of the region they came from 
and to influence policies in the new state they lived in, challenging the negative 
stereotypes of Arabs in Canada. At the time, Arab nationalism was strong among the 
newcomer community and the number of Arab-Canadians was small, so it made sense 
politically and logistically to unite under the banner of one organisation.  
As early as 1982, CAF commissioned a study about racial stereotypes of Arabs 
in political cartoons published in Canadian newspapers, where Arabs were repeatedly 
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portrayed as terrorists. The researcher pointed to the danger of such pervasive negative 
imagery, recalling the role played by German caricaturists in their similar depictions of 
Jews as laying the groundwork for the Holocaust.
28
 During the war against Iraq, after 
the invasion of Kuwait, CAF documented over 100 violent anti-Arab incidents across 
Canada.
29
 
With the continuing migration of Arabs to Canada, with many fleeing wars or 
repressive regimes, and with the weakening of Arab nationalist sentiment in the Middle 
East, Arab newcomers began to retreat into national- or sectarian-based organisations, 
and CAF became an umbrella for those smaller groups (by 2010, CAF stated that its 
membership consisted of forty Arab-Canadian community groups). CAF‘s aims 
included influencing Canadian public policy in matters related to the Middle East, and 
raising issues of civil liberties, racial profiling, and racism affecting Arab-Canadians. 
With the restrictions on multicultural funding, CAF began to also run 
government-funded programs, such as Job Search Workshops aimed at assisting new 
immigrants in learning skills like resume and cover letter writing. CAF also ran a LINC 
Program (Language Instruction for Newcomers to Canada) for eleven years with 
funding provided by Citizenship & Immigration Canada (CIC); in 2008, CIC approved 
the continuation of the program‘s contract for 2009–2010. 
After September 11, when racial profiling of Arab-Canadians and Muslims 
increased, CAF was heavily involved in organising a response to new legislation that 
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enhanced the targeting of Canadians of Arab origin, such as the Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Act of June 2002, and the Anti-Terrorism Act, introduced in 
October 2001. In a position paper to CIC , published in April 2003, CAF warned of the 
sweeping new anti-terror regulations, explaining that such measures after ‗September 
the 11th and its aftermath have left Arab and Muslim Canadians reeling with sentiments 
of anxiety, fear, alienation, marginalization, betrayal, and disillusionment‘.30 However, 
the language used by CAF sought to strike a balance between civil liberties and the 
security concerns of the state. For example, in 2005, CAF president Omar Alghabra 
(later to become a Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party of Canada) stated in the 
CAF Annual Report that it was ‗working hard to advance a Canada that is inclusive of 
diversity and respectful of the balance required to protect both security and civil 
liberties‘.31 Earlier in April 2003, CAF‘s position statement on multiculturalism and 
civil rights argued that:  
given that multiculturalism is premised on the equal treatment and respect of all 
citizens, Canada needs to consider how the security agenda and multiculturalism 
can co-exist. To date, the former has come at the expense of the latter . . . we 
need to determine, as a society, how to combine our desire to respect human 
rights and multiculturalism with our need to protect our security and trade 
interests.
32
 
 
With security becoming the dominant theme of Canadian politics, and with the 
rightward shift in Canadian foreign policy towards overt support for US policy 
objectives in the Middle East, CAF‘s straddling strategy became increasingly untenable. 
Under the new presidency of Khaled Mouammar, CAF‘s political rhetoric shifted to a 
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more active condemnation of Canadian foreign policy and toward explicit support for 
Palestinian and anti-war solidarity actions and groups, such as the Coalition Against 
Israeli Apartheid and the Toronto Coalition to Stop the War. On the one hand, the newly 
elected Conservative government leadership was not meeting with CAF, such courtesy 
meetings had at least existed with previous governments. CAF itself, largely in response 
to events in the Middle East, was becoming increasingly alienated and taking public 
positions condemning the shift in both foreign and domestic policies related to Arabs 
and Palestinians. This coincided with the emergence of a stronger grassroots movement 
in support of Palestinian human rights across campuses in Canada, a development that 
emboldened CAF and led it to take a more active role at the grassroots level—versus the 
lobbying model which no longer seemed to yield results on the political front. This shift 
alienated some of CAF‘s traditional base organisations invested in keeping open lines of 
communication with political parties, and in keeping and securing more funding for the 
services they provided through CIC grants.  
But the disjuncture between the Canadian government and CAF became 
particularly marked in the summer of 2006, when Israel attacked Lebanon. While CAF 
helped to organise demonstrations against the war and mobilised the Arab-Canadian 
community, the Harper government‘s response was one of overt support for Israel. By 
2006, then, the leadership of CAF was explicitly making the connections between on- 
going wars in the Middle East and domestic policies affecting Arab Canadians. 
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It was in February 2009 that minister Kenney announced that he would review 
the federal funding to CAF for its settlement services. It is very telling that he made this 
announcement at a conference against the ‗new anti-Semitism‘ in London, UK on 
February 18, 2009: 
These [Canadian Islamic Congress (CIC) and CAF] and other organisations are 
free within the confines of our law and consistent with our traditions of freedom 
of expression, to speak their mind, but they should not expect to receive 
resources from the state, support from taxpayers or any other form of official 
respect from the government or the organs of our State [emphasis added]. And I 
would encourage all other governments to take a similar approach to 
organisations that either excuse violence against Jews or express essentially anti-
Semitic sentiments.
33
 
 
Here, Kenney was articulating the view that governmental funding could be made 
contingent on recipients‘ political views. This happened soon after Khaled Mouammar, 
during a rally against the bombing of Gaza that year, had called Kenney (and other 
Canadian politicians) ‗professional whores‘ for their support of Israel. Kenney explicitly 
identifies the anti-war organising of CAF with anti-Semitism, altering the definition of 
anti-Semitism itself. Any legitimate criticism of the Canadian state‘s overt support and 
justification during Israel‘s military assault on Lebanon in 2006 and later on Gaza in 
2008/9, which killed hundreds of people and destroyed entire neighbourhoods, was thus 
dismissed.  
At the time, CAF‘s member organisations issued a statement supporting CAF 
President Khaled Mouammar, but did add that Mouammar‘s use of the term 
‗professional whore‘ was ‗unfortunate‘. The groups were attempting damage control at 
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this point, but that did not help. Divisions among the groups were accentuated however; 
as, internally, groups argued that the CAF leadership approach was alienating the Arab 
community from the mainstream Canadian political establishment. While there was 
broad support for the CAF leadership at the grassroots level, especially in the student 
movement, the more established sections of the community were starting to make their 
opposition heard and argue that they would have to disaffiliate from CAF to save their 
reputations.  
On March 18, 2009, Rick Stewart, then Associate Assistant Deputy minister, 
Operations at CIC, wrote to CAF that the government would not renew a two-year, $2.1 
million contract, which expired that month, for immigrant language instruction that 
CAF provided. A second $473,873 contract for immigrant job search assistance was 
also threatened. Stewart‘s letter included a statement from minister Kenney justifying 
the decision to halt funding. It is worth quoting at length:  
Serious concerns have arisen with respect to certain public statements that have 
been made by yourself or other officials of the CAF. These statements have 
included the promotion of hatred, anti-Semitism and support for the banned 
terrorist organisations Hamas and Hezbollah. The objectionable nature of these 
public statements in that they appear to reflect the CAF‘s evident support for 
terrorist organisations and positions on its part which are arguably anti-Semitic 
raises serious questions about the integrity of your organisation and has 
undermined the government‘s confidence in the CAF as an appropriate partner 
for the delivery of settlement services to newcomers.
34
 
 
Interestingly, the letter uses terms such as ‗they appear to reflect‘ and ‗arguably anti-
Semitic‘ -- vague terms that avoid any legal terminology, reference to hate-crimes, or 
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reference to anti-terror legislation. In other words, the statement is based on the 
perceptions and biases of the minister in charge, not on any formal investigation that 
CAF was given a right to respond to. The use of terms such as ‗terrorist‘ and ‗anti-
Semitism‘ provided a context in which even liberal notions of due process and 
impartiality could simply be ignored. This is a common mechanism used throughout 
cases of censorship against Palestine solidarity outside Canada as well.  
In the legal proceedings that followed CAF‘s application to the federal court for 
an interim injunction, the court did find that minister Kenney may have breached his 
legal duty to act fairly towards CAF. Justice Kelen, who presided over the case, made it 
clear that it would be inappropriate for the minister to cut CAF‘s funding because its 
President had called the minister a name, stating: 
Being a target of public criticism is part of holding public office. If the minister 
decided to cancel the English as a Second Language funding contract for the 
Canadian Arab community simply because he was called a name . . . his 
decision should not stand. It was not unexpected that the Arab community 
would be repulsed by Israel‘s invasion of Gaza . . . the Arab community was 
upset that the Canadian government did not strongly protest this attack. Many 
reputable Canadian Jews were similarly opposed to [the] attack. 
35
 
 
In its decision, the court stated that the minister was legally obligated to advise 
CAF of his reasons for intending to cancel the contract, to provide CAF with a full 
opportunity to respond, and to fairly take into account this response before making his 
final decision. Minister Kenney took only the procedural lesson to heart; as will be 
explained below, for later funding cuts to Palestine House, he sent a letter warning that 
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he was investigating the organisation, requested a response, and later proceeded to cut 
the funding. 
Palestine House 
The Palestine House Educational and Cultural Centre suffered a similar fate to the 
Canadian Arab Federation in 2012. Palestine House is a not-for-profit organisation that 
was established in June 1992 through the joint efforts of various Palestinian associations 
in Canada. It serves as the educational, cultural, and social centre for the Palestinian 
community. On December 16, 2011, in response to an application to renew its CIC 
funding, the organisation received a letter signed by Kenney, notifying it of a review. 
The letter noted that the settlement programme was not only for language training, ‗it 
also facilitates the settlement and social, cultural, economic and civic integration of 
sometimes vulnerable and impressionable immigrants and refugees into Canadian 
Society.‘ The letter also stated, ‗we expect that a service provider will conduct itself in a 
manner that could not be perceived as extreme or endorsing violence against any person 
or group,‘ adding that the review will take into account actions, statements, and 
positions that ‗may be incompatible with CIC‘s interest in providing services to new 
Canadians, free of any association with extreme political activity or views‘.36 The letter 
did not specify how the review would be conducted, or importantly, what constituted 
‗extreme‘ activity and political views.  
The letter went on to stress three actions that the ministry found objectionable, 
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explaining that ‗Palestine House has a history of taking positions that could be 
interpreted as extreme or supportive of terrorists and terrorism and viewed as offensive 
to newcomers and to many Canadians‘.37 The incidents cited in the letter as 
objectionable included: ‗the presence on your [Palestine House] website of a map 
showing a Palestinian state encompassing all of Israel.‘ A Palestine House event held on 
Oct 8, 2011, marking the release by Israel of about 1,000 prisoners in an exchange deal 
with Hamas for the abducted Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, was also cited, with the letter 
stating that the freed prisoners were ‗convicted terrorists and at least one individual who 
murdered two Canadian citizens.‘ Lastly, a March 2010 event was cited, for which the 
Palestine House hosted Abdul Bari Atwan, a journalist based in London, for Palestinian 
Land Day commemorations, which the centre hosts yearly. The letter specifically 
quoted Atwan‘s comment from a televised interview on a Lebanese channel, where he 
said: ‗If the Iranian missiles strike Israel, by Allah, I will go to Trafalgar Square and 
dance with delight.‘ 
Palestine House responded by explaining that the map on the website was 
merely an outline of historical Palestine, a geography that many Palestinian-Canadians 
continue to be connected to, adding that it could be easily removed. On the subject of 
the event to mark the release of Palestinian prisoners, Palestine House explained that the 
event was in support of the prisoners and all their families, not one particular prisoner, 
adding that the majority of Palestinians are tried under Israeli military courts for 
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political activities of any kind. On the final issue of hosting Abdul Bari Atwan, the 
organisation made clear that he was hosted as a prominent London-based Palestinian 
journalist with a long career, and that it was not aware of the particular statement quoted 
and in any case did not agree with it. 
The response did not convince the Ministry, and in January 2012, the Palestine 
House was informed that the CIC would not enter into a new agreement with them. 
Twenty staff members lost their jobs due to these cuts, the majority of them both 
women and non-Palestinian. Most individuals receiving services from the centre were 
of Chinese and South Asian background, and were neither Arab nor Palestinian.  
In both of the above cases, CAF and Palestine House were not assessed on their 
programme delivery (in fact both had received high ranking for this). Rather, the 
judgment was on their positions, actions, and events regarding Canadian foreign 
policies, and specifically their criticism of Israeli state policies. One of the arguments on 
the state side was that state funding should not go towards advocacy activities. 
However, funds given by the state through CIC for settlement programmes are 
monitored very closely through monthly reports that managers must submit to CIC; 
these reports are detailed to the point of recording exact spending on photocopying, 
office supplies, and so on. Both CAF and Palestine House insisted that none of their 
activities that were Palestine-related were ever supported with CIC funds. This indicates 
that the issue for the government was not the manner in which the funding was used (as 
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the monthly reports they received easily proved the effective organisational operations 
in using the resources) but a case of specifically disciplining groups for their activities 
unrelated to ‗service delivery‘. It is unclear, however, what positions on Palestine CIC 
would deem acceptable within the norms of ‗tolerable‘ speech and the confines of 
official multiculturalism.  
While the above-mentioned funding cuts happened under the Conservative 
government, politicians from Canada‘s Liberal Party have been supportive and involved 
in the silencing campaign. In the run up to his successful 2015 election victory, the 
current Liberal Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau,  tweeted ‗The BDS movement, like 
Israeli Apartheid Week, has no place on Canadian campuses‘.38 And it was Paul Martin, 
a Liberal prime minister, who first explained the relationship between Canada and Israel 
in terms of shared values. With very few exceptions, the Canadian political 
establishment is devoutly pro-Israel (and makes no effort to hide this), yet there is 
hardly space for Arab-Canadians to challenge this status quo.Therefore, the 
acquiescence of Arab-Canadian community organisations is necessary for Canadian 
foreign policy imperatives. For all the rhetoric about celebrating diversity and the 
importance of multiculturalism to Canadian identity, the limits of tolerance within an 
integrative multiculturalism formed around ‗core values‘ are clear when it comes to 
oppositional political views.   
Conclusion 
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Arabs and Muslims have come to understand that ‗integration debates‘ reduce 
their communities into extremists and moderates, and that the main role of a citizen in 
such a circumstance is to prove at all times that s/he belongs to the latter. However, as 
Thobani explains, ‗unfortunately for the good Muslims, no matter how deep their 
gratitude to the nation, no matter how ardent their embrace of western civilizational 
norms, the new anti-terrorism measures continue to make them as equally suspect as the 
bad Muslims‘.39Palestinian and Palestine solidarity groups more specifically find 
themselves marginalised and silenced through an ongoing process that  brands them as 
‗extreme‘ and ‗outside the norms of civility‘, with ‗civility‘ offering ‗an ideological 
marker of those contrasting themselves as civil from those they take to deny the 
condition, or even its possibility‘.40 
Both  CAF and Palestine House were doomed to fit the category of ‗bad 
Muslim‘ despite all attempts to escape this label. The securitisation of state/community 
relations increases levels of state censorship against community groups propagating 
oppositional views. The neoliberal tactic of subjecting the funding of community 
organisations to market incentives further increases the vulnerability of community 
groups and strengthens the state‘s power to discipline them. In an atmosphere of 
decreasing funding, with the language of ‗homegrown terrorism and domestic threats,‘ 
commonplace, self-imposed censorship becomes a key method of survival. On the other 
hand, state silencing campaigns rarely stop at the boundaries of single communities, 
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eventually dynamics of racialisation and inferiorisation spill out to encompass all 
dissent against state policies. 
Both CAF and Palestine House continue to operate without government funding, 
but in many ways the funding cuts had the intended outcome of curtailing dissent by 
setting these cases as examples to warn off others. The cuts to funding also acted to 
effectively polarise community organisations between those who would stand up 
publicly against government policy and those preferring to work within the political 
space allotted by the government. The court case for CAF took up much of the 
organisation‘s resources and the group decided not to appeal the court decision for lack 
of resources, while the government side was able to stall and delay proceedings.  
Under current circumstances of increasing scrutiny and criminalisation of 
Palestine solidarity internationally, it is crucial to ask, as Kundnani does in the UK case: 
‗is there, then, any basis for overcoming the legacy of communal identity politics 
through building new alliances, not in the sense of paper coalitions but at the level of 
genuine solidarities rooted in community-based activism?‘41 Such coalition building 
would have to centrally address the manifestations of anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism 
and to seriously tackle the issue of sustainable grassroots organising outside state 
funding structures. 
With the rise of increasingly exclusionary nationalisms, discussions on 
multiculturalism and anti-racist alliances are urgently needed beyond a binary of for or 
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against multiculturalism. A multiculturalism not embedded within anti-racist politics 
can amount to a neoliberal celebration of marketable diversity at the expense of social 
and economic justice. It is not merely a ‗recognition‘ and ‗tolerance‘ that the state can 
dictate, manipulate, fund and sanction that will resolve issue of institutionalised racism. 
Without substantively addressing relations of power, especially the ways in which 
exclusion and silencing operate, the dominant framing of national identity in western 
states around core values will continue to act as a veil for the status quo, condemning 
those outside the mainstream to a position of permanent marginalisation.  
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